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A B S T R A C T   
A confidence-based climate between public administrations and citizens is essential. This paper 
argues and provides empirical evidence that depending on the perceived interaction history, 
different policies are needed to build versus maintain confidence. Applying the extended Slippery 
Slope Framework of tax compliance, an online and a laboratory experiment were conducted to 
explore whether tax authorities’ coercive and legitimate power have different effects depending 
on whether they are situated in an antagonism-based or confidence-based climate. Results 
showed that in an antagonism-based interaction climate, a combination of high coercive and high 
legitimate power changed the climate into a confidence-based interaction climate. In contrast, in 
a confidence-based climate the same power combination did not maintain but erode the climate. 
Results also suggest that confidence-based climates are maintained by low coercive power 
combined with high legitimate power. The paper concludes that interaction climates operate as 
psychological frames which guide how policy instruments affect taxpayers’ trust in the tax au-
thorities.  
1. Introduction 
Mutual confidence is important. This is as true for couples and families, as it is for societies. A confidence-based climate in which 
citizens and the public administration trust each other, share the same values, and perceive each other as partners enhances co-
operation and is an important pillar for functioning democracies (Goodsell, 2008; Putnam, 1995). In this paper we want to focus on 
trust in tax authorities, as an essential determinant of citizens’ tax compliance and thus, the provision of public goods such as schools 
or health care (Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 2008). However, countries differ concerning the prevailing level of trust in their tax 
authorities. Whereas trust is low in some countries such as in the U.S. or Italy (Drake, 2013) there is high trust in other countries such 
as in Switzerland (Lozza & Castiglioni, 2018). 
Some tax authorities are perceived as antagonistic and need to build a confidence-based climate with citizens, whereas others 
already have citizens’ trust so that they face the challenge of maintaining trust. Both building and maintaining trust may be im-
perative for tax authorities to ensure cooperation. Research identified several determinants of trust in public administrations, such as 
law enforcement or legitimacy (Mishler & Rose, 2001; Tyler, 2003). But do tax authorities in need of building trust have to implement 
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the same policy measures as those in need of maintaining trust? One might argue that measures that are good for building trust will 
also work for maintaining trust. Note, however, that a climate in which trust is absent (or low) presents a markedly different context 
than a climate in which trust is already present (and high). 
In particular, determinants of trust may differ depending on whether the initial interaction climate is antagonism-based (i.e., 
related to mutual hostility) versus confidence-based (e.g., in a trusting partnership with shared values). Testing this relation requires 
a set-up that addresses the situational differences and temporal dynamics of building versus maintaining confidence-based climates; 
aspects that empirical research has not yet incorporated (Keele, 2007; Rothstein, 2000). Also theoretical accounts, for public ad-
ministration in general (Battaglio, Nicola, Paolo, & Paola, 2018) and tax administration in particular (Braithwaite, 2003) as well as 
empirical studies (Batrancea et al., 2019), highlighted the importance of context for the effect of authorities’ enforcement but only for 
rule compliance and not for trust in authorities. 
Additionally, these assumed contextual and temporal dependencies were rarely tested empirically. Based on the theory of the 
extended Slippery Slope Framework, the aim of the present research is to experimentally examine the differential determinants of 
trust building versus trust maintenance. 
2. The extended Slippery Slope Framework 
The Slippery Slope Framework was developed as a conceptual tool to summarize determinants of tax compliance into the di-
mensions power of authorities (i.e., the perception that authorities are able to ensure compliance) and trust in authorities (i.e., the 
perception that authorities work for the common good; Kirchler et al., 2008). The extended Slippery Slope Framework (eSSF) posits 
that the dynamic between power and trust explains how interaction climates between taxpayers and tax authorities can be built and 
changed (Gangl, Hofmann, & Kirchler, 2015). It distinguishes between two types of power (perceived coercive and legitimate power) 
and two types of trust (reason-based and implicit trust) which in combination constitute different perceived interaction climates 
between citizens and the tax authorities. Thereby, the eSSF examines and predicts the perceptions of taxpayers which motivate tax 
compliance behavior. 
With coercive and legitimate power, the eSSF connects to the main power theories in economics and psychology concerning the 
potential and perceived ability of a party to influence another parties’ behavior (French & Raven, 1959; Tyler, 2003). Coercive power 
is the perceived ability of the administration to enforce law compliance through incentives (i.e., the capability to control and punish 
or reward citizens). Legitimate power is the administration’s ability to convince citizens to comply voluntarily with rules and reg-
ulations through legitimate procedures, expertise, information, and a positive image. 
Reason-based and implicit trust are defined in line with the socio-cognitive trust theory of Castelfranchi and Falcone (2010), and 
relate to distinctions made in include a dash theories of social cognition (Kahneman, 2003). Reason-based trust means that citizens 
deliberately trust the tax authorities on which they depend, because it pursues an important goal, is perceived as motivated, com-
petent, and benevolent, and external conditions allow it to work professionally. In contrast, implicit trust is considered a more 
automatic trust reaction to associative learned stimuli, such as perceived shared identity, friendly faces, or official documents. 
Referring to research on regulation (Adler, 2001; Haslam & Fiske, 1999), the eSSF defines three interaction climates: antagonism- 
based, service-based, and confidence-based climates. Antagonism-based climates are defined as hostile climates in which mistrust 
prevails and authorities and citizens work against each other like “cops and robbers” (Kirchler et al., 2008). In service-based climates, 
such as in new public management approaches (Bryson, Crosby, & Bloomberg, 2014), the tax administration (as service provider) and 
citizens (as clients) cooperate on the basis of a technical-bureaucratic relationship. In confidence-based climates, tax authorities and 
taxpayers share the same values, trust each other implicitly and collaborate as partners (Alm & Torgler, 2011; Brenninkmeijer, 2016). 
Compared to antagonism-based and service-based climates, confidence-based climates are likely also characterized by positive social 
norms concerning tax honesty. This belief that most other citizens are honest taxpayers is another important determinant of high 
individual tax honesty (Hallsworth, List, Metcalfe, & Vlaev, 2017). Thus, confidence-based climates need fewer resources on mon-
itoring and administrative procedures as citizens are committed to cooperate with the authorities. It is therefore advantageous for 
administrations to build a confidence-based climate or to maintain it. 
3. Building, changing, and maintaining interaction climates 
The eSSF describes how tax administrations can build, change, and maintain perceived interaction climates ranging from an-
tagonism-based to service-based and confidence-based climates (see Fig. 1). A key element is the notion that tax authorities’ use of 
power may affect trust, and thereby affect interaction climates. In particular, coercive power is assumed to foster mistrust and to 
hinder implicit trust reactions which, in turn, builds an antagonism-based climate in which the tax authorities and taxpayers work 
against each other (Gangl et al., 2015; Hofmann, Gangl, Kirchler, & Stark, 2014; Hofmann, Hartl, Gangl, Hartner-Tiefenthaler, & 
Kirchler, 2017). This notion fits well with research showing that control and sanctioning can undermine trust (Das & Teng, 1998; 
Kramer, 1999), and fuel suspicion about the good intentions of an administration (Feld & Frey, 2007; Rothstein, 2000) or fellow 
citizens (Bohnet & Baytelman, 2007; Mulder, Van Dijk, De Cremer, & Wilke, 2006). Experiments also show that coercive power leads 
to reactance and enforcement, and drives out the moral implications of tax cooperation (Gangl, Pfabigan, Lamm, Kirchler, & 
Hofmann, 2017). 
The eSSF framework also posits that, by combining high coercive power with high legitimate power, tax administrations may 
increase reason-based trust which can change antagonism-based climates into service-based ones (Gangl et al., 2015; Hofmann et al., 
2017). This insight relates to findings showing that legitimate and fair sanctioning systems overcome the negative effects of pure 
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sanctioning systems and instead, foster trust in public administrations (Mooijman, Van Dijk, Van Dijk, & Ellemers, 2017). Thus, 
coercive power combined with legitimate power might foster the feeling that sanctions are used in a professional and targeted way, to 
restore justice and uphold cooperation (Mooijman et al., 2017; Wenzel, 2003). Actually, there is a large body of literature from other 
disciplines than tax research that argues that coercion which is used in a fair manner is essential for cooperation (Fehr & Rockenbach, 
2003) because it generates instead of destroys legitimacy and trust (Hough, Jackson, Bradford, Myhill, & Quinton, 2010; Tyler, 2011). 
Based on this literature, the eSSF suggests that coercive power which is combined with high legitimate power gives good reasons to 
trust, reduces perceptions of an antagonism-based climate and increases perceptions of service-based climates. 
Service-based climates fall in-between antagonism-based and confidence-based climates. Over time and with positive experiences 
related to legitimate power, service-based climates change into confidence-based climates (Gangl et al., 2015). A good reputation and 
positive experiences with legitimate power can transform reason-based trust into implicit trust. This idea streams from the literature 
on dual-process theories suggesting that cognitions, initially based on more deliberate processes, over time and through repetition 
can change to more automatic processes (Evans 2008). Thus, trust first based on and built by deliberate considerations may transcend 
to new settings through automatic and associative learning processes (Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010). 
Confidence-based climates are jeopardized if authorities use coercive power. In a high trust relationship harsh coercive power 
might be perceived as a betrayal of trust (Joskowicz-Jabloner & Leiser, 2013). Thus, the eSSF suggests that if individuals perceive a 
confidence-based climate, only low coercive power combined with high legitimate power can maintain this climate. High coercive 
power, even when applied legitimately, will be seen as a sign of distrust (Kramer, 1999; Van der Weele, 2009). It will interrupt 
implicit trust reactions and trigger deliberate considerations about whether or not to trust. Thus, it will erode a confidence-based 
climate and change it into an antagonism-based climate. However, this assumption that high coercive power combined with high 
legitimate power erodes a confidence-based climate and thus, only has a positive effect in an antagonism-based climate, to the best of 
our knowledge, has not yet been tested empirically. This differential effect of legitimate coercion has also rarely been tested related to 
other theories than the eSSF. This is surprising, as behavioral science scholars state that the effectiveness of any public policy 
intervention is depending on the context (Ruggeri, 2019). 
4. Research aims and research questions 
The current psychological research aims to experimentally examine how perceptions of antagonism-based and confidence-based 
climates can be changed or maintained by the means of perceived coercive and legitimate power and how this affects cooperation, 
i.e., tax payments. In the following we present our research questions. 
Research Question 1 (RQ1): Does high coercive power compared to low coercive power decrease implicit trust, foster a perceived 
antagonism-based climate and reduce a perceived confidence-based climate? 
Research Question 2 (RQ2): Does high legitimate power compared to low legitimate power increase reason-based trust, reduce a 
perceived antagonism-based climate and foster a perceived confidence-based climate? 
Research Question 3(RQ3): Does high coercive power combined with high legitimate power in a confidence-based climate com-
pared to in an antagonism-based climate, decrease reason-based trust, implicit trust, a perceived confidence-based climate and 
increase a perceived antagonism-based climate? 
Research Question 4(RQ4): Does low coercive power combined with high legitimate power maintain reason-based trust, implicit 
trust and a perceived confidence-based climate in an initial confidence-based climate? 
Research Question 5(RQ5): Does high coercive power compared to low coercive power increase tax payments? 
Research Question 6(RQ6): Does high legitimate power compared to low legitimate power increase tax payments? 
5. Experiment 1 
To examine our research questions with a sample of citizens, we conducted an online experiment. We used scenarios to ma-
nipulate the interaction between tax authorities and taxpayers in a 2 (antagonism-based versus confidence-based climate) × 2 (low 
versus high coercive power) × 2 (low versus high legitimate power) within-between factorial design. 
Fig. 1. Building, changing, and maintaining interaction climates according to the eSSF.  
K. Gangl, et al.   Journal of Economic Psychology 81 (2020) 102310
3
5.1. Sample and design 
Two hundred and thirty participants were recruited in Austria online via postings in newspaper comment sections, among family 
and friends of students, and among Rotary club members. After finalizing data collection, we excluded data of 31 participants 
(because they indicated in an open comment box to not have followed instructions or because their responding time was longer than 
the mean plus three standard deviations; these participants did not differ concerning gender or age from the final sample, all 
ps  <  .11). The final sample of 199 participants consisted of 72.9% men with an average age of 42.2 years (SD = 12.58; range 21–74; 
two missing values on age). Participants were allowed to give multiple answers on their educational status; most had a university 
degree (51.3%, high school degree: 39.2%, vocational school: 7.0%, vocational training: 6.0%, basic school degree: 3.5%, other: 
9.5%). Concerning working status most were employed (66.3%, self-employed: 28.6%, in education: 13.1%, retired 8.0%, maternity 
leave: 2.5%, at home: 2.5%, unemployed: 2.0%). 
5.2. Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions of a 2 (antagonistic versus confidence climate) × 2 (low versus 
high coercive power) × 2 (low versus high legitimate power) factorial design (see Fig. 2). At the beginning, participants were asked 
to imagine being in their first year of business as a self-employed in the fictitious country Chomland. They were also asked to imagine 
to earn a specific yearly gross income in Euro over several years on which they would have to pay taxes. Moreover, the tax authorities 
would conduct audits with a 1:6 change (approx. 17%) and those who would be detected as evaders would have to pay back the 
evaded amount plus the same amount as a fine. After this introduction, the study proceeded with the manipulation of the interaction 
climate, the first assessment at time 1 (T1) of tax payments, perceived climate, trust and power; the manipulation of coercive and 
legitimate power and the second assessment at time 2 (T2) of tax payments, perceived climate, trust and power. In addition, sex, age, 
employment status, and income were assessed as sociodemographic characteristics. The original material in German in presented in 
the Supplementary material. 
5.3. Experimental manipulations: 
5.3.1. Manipulation of Perceived Antagonistic- (Confidence-) based climate condition (T1). 
Assume that as a self-employed in Chomland you are talking to another self-employed friend about the tax climate in Chomland. 
He tells you that the climate between the state tax authorities and the citizens of Chomland is characterized by mutual (mis)trust. The 
tax authorities assume that most taxpayers evade (pay) taxes and therefore must be prosecuted (respected) and punished (supported). 
The taxpayers, in turn, feel tortured (understood). They think the authorities are interested to catch taxpayers doing something wrong 
(in working in the interest of taxpayers). Put yourself in this situation! How do you think you'd be treated personally by this 
authority? What feelings and thoughts would you have as a taxpayer to that tax office in Chomland? Write down three of these 
feelings or thoughts: 
5.3.2. Manipulation of Perceived high (low) Coercive and Legitimate Power (T2). 
Participants read that the government of Chomland changed which also led to a change in the tax administration: 
The tax authority is now imposing very high (low) penalties for tax evasion and is (not) acting in an exemplary manner. It works 
both based on legal (illegal) measures and with frequent (rare) controls. In addition, the tax authority is mainly composed of very 
well (poorly) trained employees who provide (un)professional consulting and apply strict (few) tax audits. Their working principles 
are based especially (little) on the traceability of their decisions and especially (little) on penalties for tax evasion. Overall, the rigour 
of controls and the severity of penalties for tax evasion are of great (minor) importance to the tax authority and the accuracy of tax 
returns is of minor (great) importance. 
Fig. 2. Experimental procedure.  
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5.4. Dependent variables 
Tax Payments. All participants filled in five identical tax compliance scenarios (Alm, Sanchez, & Juan, 1995), representing five 
years of a self-employed taxpayer at T1 and T2. In each scenario, participants learned their income (ranging from 20,000 to 30,000 
Euro), the tax rate (30%), audit probability (1:6), and fine (twice the evaded amount). 
Assume it has passed another year. In this year you have earned a gross income of 35,000,- (30,000; 25,000; 40,000; 20,000) 
Euro. According to the legal regulations, you have to pay 10,500 (9,000; 7,500; 12,000; 6,000) Euros (30%) as taxes from your gross 
income. You have various options for claiming payments that are not necessarily tax deductible, or to not declare some revenues. If a 
tax audit should take place, you will have to pay back the evaded amount as well as a penalty of the same amount. How much tax do 
you decide to pay (0 to 10,500 (9,000; 7,500; 12,000; 6,000)) Euros? 
Participants filled in the concrete number themselves. We calculated the mean of the relative honesty at T1 and T2 resulting in 
values between 0 (full dishonesty) and 1 (full honesty). 
After the tax scenario, we assessed the following scales, adapted from Hofmann et al. (2014), all answered on a seven-point Likert 
type scale with labeled endpoints (1 = I totally disagree/7 = I totally agree): 
Perceived antagonism-based climate was assessed with three items (time 1: Cronbach α = 0.87, time 2: α = 0.88): Between the 
tax authority and taxpayers there exists a climate… of inconsiderateness/ruthlessness/cops and robbers. 
Perceived Confidence-based climate was assessed with three items (time 1: α = 0.94, time 2: α = 0.95): Between the tax 
authority and taxpayers there exists a climate which is characterized by… mutual trust/shared responsibility/cooperation. 
Perceived Implicit Trust was assessed with three items (time 1: α = 0.88, time 2: α = 0.90): I trust the tax authority… mostly 
without thinking about it/without much concern/in most cases automatically. 
Perceived Reason-based Trust was assessed with seven items (time 1: α = 0.82, time 2: α = 0.87): I trust the tax authority 
because… there is no alternative/its goals seem plausible to me/it has dedicated employees/it does its job well/it is benevolent to the 
taxpayers/the stable economic situation guarantees its work/it has the necessary support to carry out its work. 
5.5. Assessment of manipulation checks 
Perceived Coercive Power (time 1: α = 0.82, time 2: α = 0.91) was assessed with three items: The tax authority… punishes 
severely/prosecutes taxpayers with controls and fines/enforces its demands with audits and fines. 
Perceived Legitimate Power (time 1: α = 0.80, time 2: α = 0.91) was assessed with five items. The tax authority … due to the 
legal situation, is in the position to levy taxes/shares comprehensible information/knows how a correctly filled in tax return should 
look like/makes all taxpayers understand which taxes they have to pay and how they have to pay them/knows how the correct tax 
return of every singly taxpayers should look like. 
5.6. Statistical power 
To examine our research questions, we investigated the direct effect of our manipulations on the dependent variables. Therefore, 
we conducted 2 (antagonistic-based versus confidence-based climate) by 2 (low versus high coercive power) by 2 (low versus high 
legitimate power) ANOVAs with perceived antagonism-based climate, perceived confidence-based climate, reason-based trust and 
implicit trust as well as tax payments as dependent variables at Time 1 and Time 2 as repeated measurement factor. It should be noted 
that the present between-within subject design requires smaller sample sizes than a pure between subject design (Bellemare, 
Bissonnette, & Kröger, 2005). Detailed sensitivity analyses were conducted with the program G*power. Generally, sensitivity analyses 
for an ANOVA: repeated measures, within-between interaction (F-tests, p = .05, power = 0.80, six groups, two measures) indicated 
that with an N = 199 we can detect effects of f = 0.13 (d = 0.25). Concerning RQ1 and RQ2, sensitivity analyses for t-tests for 
dependent means (two-sided, p = .05, power = 0.80) showed that we can detect effects between d = 0.27 and d = 0.29 (min. 
N = 93; max. N = 106). The same sensitivity analyses (t-tests for dependent means, two-sided, p = .05, power = 0.80) indicated 
that for RQ3 (N = 30 and N = 23) effects of d = 0.53 and d = 0.61 and for RQ4 (N = 25) effects of d = 0.58 can be detected. For 
RQ5 and RQ6, effects between d = 0.27 and d = 0.29 (min. N = 93; max. N = 106) are detectable with the current design (t-tests for 
dependent means, two-sided, p = .05, power = 0.80). Cohen (1988) suggests that d = 0.20 are small effects, d = 0.50 are medium 
effects and d = 0.80 are large effects. Thus, we can detect at least medium effects. 
5.7. Manipulation checks 
Perceived Tax Climate (Time 1). Participants in the antagonism-based condition perceived the interaction climate as more 
antagonism-based (M = 4.29, SD = 1.72) than participants in the confidence-based condition (M = 1.77, SD = 0.99), t 
(197) = 12.05, p  <  .001; Cohen’s d = 1.73. In a similar vein, participants in the confidence-based condition perceived the 
interaction climate as more confidence-based (M = 5.69, SD = 1.48) than participants in the antagonism-based condition 
(M = 2.31, SD = 1.25), t(197) = 17.44, p  <  .001, d = 2.50. These findings suggest that our manipulation of interaction climate 
was successful. 
Perceived Coercive and Legitimate Power (Time 2): As intended, participants in the high coercive power condition (M = 5.93, 
SD = 1.21) perceived more coercive power than participants in the low coercive power condition (M = 3.65, SD = 1.66), t 
(197) = 11.19, p  <  .001, d = 1.59. Participants in the high legitimate power condition (M = 5.64, SD = 1.33) perceived more 
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legitimate power than participants in the low legitimate power condition (M = 3.37, SD = 1.21), t(197) = 12.62, p  <  .001, 
d = 1.79. 
5.8. Results 
Detailed analyses of direct and indirect effects are presented in Supplementary material (1.2; 1.3). To examine our research 
questions, we conducted five 2 (antagonism-based versus confidence-based climate) by 2 (low versus high coercive power) by 2 (low 
versus high legitimate power) ANOVAs with perceived antagonism-based climate, perceived confidence-based climate, reason-based 
trust, implicit trust, and tax payments as dependent variables, and T1 and T2 assessment as repeated measurement factor. We also 
conducted planned comparisons (paired t-tests) to examine the differentiated effect of combinations of coercive and legitimate power 
in the antagonism-based versus confidence-based climate1. Fig. 3 provides an overview of the results. Descriptive results (mean, 
standard deviation) concerning all main and interaction effects are presented in the Supplementary material. 
Perceived Antagonism-based Climate. Supporting the assumptions of RQ1, the Coercive power × Time interaction (F[1, 
191] = 21.45, p  <  .001, η2 = 0.10) showed that low coercive power had no impact (p = .13), whereas high coercive power 
increased the perceived antagonism-based climate (T1: M = 3.25, SD = 1.95; T2: M = 4.34, SD = 1.96, t[105] = 4.53, p  <  .001; 
d = 0.56). 
Supporting arguments underlying RQ2, the Legitimate power × Time interaction (F[1, 191] = 32.21, p  <  .001, η2 = 0.15) 
showed that low legitimate power increased the perceived antagonism-based climate (T1: M = 3.39, SD = 2.01; T2: M = 4.49, 
SD = 1.88, t[98] = 4.07, p  <  .001; d = 0.57), whereas high legitimate power had no effect (p = .20). 
Supporting assumptions of RQ3, planned comparisons showed that the combination of high coercive and high legitimate power 
decreased the perceived antagonism-based climate in an initial antagonism-based climate (T1: M = 4.27, SD = 1.68; T2: M = 3.41, 
SD = 1.59; t[29] = 2.21, p = .035, d = 0.52), and increased the perceived antagonism-based climate in an initial confidence-based 
climate (T1: M = 1.88, SD = 1.15; T2: M = 3.33, SD = 1.92; t[22] = 3.87, p = .001, d = 0.92). 
Perceived Confidence-based Climate. Supporting assumptions of RQ2, the Coercive power × Time interaction (F[1, 191] = 9.49, 
p  <  .001, η2 = 0.05) showed that low coercive power had no impact on the perceived confidence-based climate (p = .95). High 
coercive power, however, decreased the climate (T1: M = 3.64, SD = 2.24; T2: M = 2.80, SD = 1.87; t[105] = 2.91, p = .004, 
d = 0.41). 
Supporting arguments underlying RQ2, the Legitimate power × Time interaction (F[1,191] = 102.11, p  <  .001, η2 = 0.35) 
indicated that low legitimate power decreased (T1: M = 3.56, SD = 2.05; T2: M = 1.91, SD = 0.99, t[98] = 7.88, p  <  .001, 
d = 1.02) and high legitimate power increased the perceived confidence-based climate (T1: M = 3.91, SD = 2.23, T2: M = 4.66, 
SD = 1.91; t[99] = 2.72, p = .008, d = 0.36). 
Supporting assumptions of RQ3, planned comparisons showed that the combination of high coercive with high legitimate power 
led to an increase in an initial antagonism-based climate (T1: M = 2.09, SD = 1.40; T2: M = 4.02, SD = 1.82; t[29] = 4.25, 
p  <  .001, d = 1.19) and to a decrease in an initial confidence-based climate (T1: M = 5.39, SD = 2.10; T2: M = 3.72, SD = 2.19; t 
[22] = 7.67, p = .014, d = 0.78). Supporting arguments underlying RQ4, low coercive power combined with high legitimate power 
did not strongly influence the perceived confidence-based climate (T1: M = 5.81, SD = 1.19, T2: M = 5.69, SD = 1.62, t 
[24] = 0.41, p = .685). 
Perceived Implicit Trust. Not supporting arguments underlying RQ1, results showed no main effect of Coercive power (p = .293) 
and no Coercive power × Time interaction (p = .085). 
Supporting assumptions of RQ3, planned comparisons showed that the combination of high coercive with high legitimate power 
increased implicit trust in an initial antagonism-based climate (T1: M = 3.38, SD = 1.53; T2: M = 4.06, SD = 1.81; t[29] = 2.31, 
p = .028, d = 0.40), whereas the same power combination had no impact in an initial confidence-based climate (p = .13). 
Supporting assumptions of RQ4, the combination of low coercive power with high legitimate power did not have a strong effect on 
implicit trust in a confidence-based climate (T1: M = 4.25, SD = 1.55, T2: M = 4.24, SD = 1.82, t[24] = 0.07, p = .940). 
Perceived Reason-based Trust. Supporting assumptions of RQ2, the Legitimate power × Time interaction (F[1, 191] = 117.89, 
p  <  .001, η2 = 0.38) revealed that low legitimate power decreased reason-based trust (T1: M = 3.82, SD = 1.21; T2: M = 2.79, 
SD = 0.98; t[98] = 8.32, p  <  .001, d = 0.94) and high legitimate power increased reason-based trust (T1: M = 3.90, SD = 1.42; 
T2: M = 4.67, SD = 1.41; t[99] = 5.05, p  <  .001, d = 0.54). 
In agreement with the reasoning underlying RQ3, planned comparisons showed that the combination of high coercive with high 
legitimate power increased reason-based trust in an initial antagonism-based climate (T1: M = 3.30, SD = 1.22; T2: M = 4.41, 
SD = 1.37; t[29] = 4.52, p  <  .001, d = 0.86), whereas the same power combination had no impact in an initial confidence-based 
climate (p = .54). Supporting assumptions of RQ4, the combination low coercive power with high legitimate power increased reason- 
based trust in the confidence-based climate (T1: M = 4.73, SD = 1.26, T2: M = 5.14, SD = 1.38, t[24] = 3.43, p = .002, d = 0.31). 
Tax Payments. Results showed a main effect for Climate, (F[1, 199] = 6.024, p = .015, η2 = 0.03), indicating that a confidence- 
based climate led to higher tax payments (T1: M = 0.88 [SD = 0.22]; T2: M = 0.86 [SD = 0.21]) than an antagonism-based climate 
(T1: M = 0.80 [SD = 0.28]; T2: M = 0.78 [SD = 0.21]). In addition, the main effect for Time was significant (F[1, 199] = 4.45, 
p = .036, η2 = 0.02), indicating that at T1 (M = 0.83, SD = 0.26) tax payments were higher than at T2 (M = 0.81, SD = 0.26). 
1 All analysis were also conducted as ANCOVAs in which sex and age were used as covariates. All significant effects remained significant and all 
non-significant effects remained non-significant. 
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Not supporting assumptions of RQ5, the Coercive power × Time interaction (F[1, 199] = 1.66, p = .20, η2 = 0.01) was not 
significant, indicating that the change in tax payments from T1 to T2 was not moderated by coercive power. 
Supporting assumptions of RQ6, the Legitimate power × Time interaction (F[1, 199] = 23.19, p  <  .001, η2 = 0.11) was 
significant: Low legitimate power decreased tax payment (T1: M = 0.86, SD = 0.22; T2: M = 0.78, SD = 0.27; t[98] = 4.56, 
p  <  .001, d = 0.33), whereas high legitimate power increased tax payments (T1: M = 0.81, SD = 0.29; T2: M = 0.84, SD = 0.26, t 
[99] = 2.19, p = .03, d = 0.13). No other main or interaction effects were significant (all ps  >  .10). 
5.9. Discussion 
Experiment 1 offered first insights into the building, changing, and maintenance of interaction climates. Confirming the as-
sumptions of RQ1, results showed that high but not low coercive power affected the perceived interaction climates. However, in 
contrast to expectations, no impact on implicit trust was found. These results corroborate studies showing that coercive power 
triggers an antagonism-based climate, but it has no robust and strong effect on implicit trust (Hofmann et al., 2014, 2017). 
Fig. 3. Overview of results of Experiment 1. Notes: The figure shows how, depending on the initial antagonism-based climate (red T1) or confidence- 
based climate (green T1), the combinations of coercive and legitimate power at T2 led to an increase or decrease of (a) the perceived antagonism- 
based climate, (b) the perceived confidence-based climate, (c) implicit trust, or (d) reason-based trust (red for the initial antagonism-based climate 
and green for the initial confidence-based climate). Means are presented with 95% confidence intervals. T1 = Time 1 (in the figure, in contrast to 
the text, all four T1 assessments are presented in combination). Time 2 assessments are given for CP + LP+ = coercive power high, legitimate 
power, CP + LP- = coercive power high, legitimate power low, CP-LP+ = coercive power low, legitimate power high, CP-LP- = coercive power 
low, legitimate power low. 
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Results also supported the assumptions of RQ2 that, compared to low legitimate power, high legitimate power increased reason- 
based trust, reduced a perceived antagonism-based climate, and fostered a confidence-based climate. In addition, low but not high 
legitimate power had an impact on the perceived antagonism-based climate and implicit trust. This indicates that low legitimate 
power might be a more important signal to citizens than high legitimate power. Importantly, our findings showed that also under 
dynamic conditions legitimate power maintains its characteristic impact on trust, interaction climates, and tax compliance (Hartl, 
Hofmann, Gangl, Hartner-Tiefenthaler, & Kirchler, 2015; Hofmann et al., 2017; Mooijman et al., 2017). 
As assumed in RQ3, compared to in an antagonism-based climate, in a confidence-based climate high coercive power combined 
with high legitimate power decreased reason-based trust and implicit trust and decreased a confidence-based climate and increased 
an antagonism-based climate. These results provide first evidence showing that the effect of legitimately applied coercive power 
depends on the initial climate and, thus, is not always fostering trust. Results also showed, as outlined in the RQ4, that in an initial 
confidence-based climate low coercive power combined with high legitimate power maintained the confidence-based climate. 
In addition, our results did not confirm that high coercive power increased tax payments (RQ5). Supporting assumptions of RQ6, 
results showed that legitimate power increased tax payments. 
6. Experiment 2 
To assess the robustness of the results of our first (online) experiment, we conducted a second, laboratory experiment, which 
allowed us to incentivize tax behavior and collect data in a more controlled environment. 
6.1. Sample and design 
Two hundred and sixty-three Austrian university students (Mage = 25.45 years, SD = 7.79; 56.7% female) were recruited for a 
behavior-dependent remunerated laboratory study on tax decision-making. Participants could provide multiple answers on their 
educational status; most had a high school degree (71.5%, university degree: 26.6%, vocational training: 1.5%, basic school: 1.5%, 
vocational school: 0.4%, other: 1.5%). Participants also were allowed to give multiple answers on their working status; most were in 
education (66.9%, employed: 31.6%, unemployed: 12.5%, self-employed: 8.0%, maternity leave: 0.8%, retired: 0.8%, at home: 
0.4%). 
6.2. Procedure 
The study was conducted in a computer laboratory in which up to 16 participants were tested simultaneously. The experimental 
setting, the task, and the manipulations of initial interaction climates, coercive power, and legitimate power were identical to 
Experiment 1. Importantly, in contrast to Experiment 1, participants knew that the audits and possible fines for detected evasion also 
would determine their remuneration for participation. We used the fictitious currency ECU. Participants were informed that at the 
end of the study, based on one randomly chosen tax round, the experimenter would roll a die to determine whether this round would 
be audited. The number “1″ would result in an audit and the other numbers (“2” to “6”) would not. If participants would be caught as 
evaders they would have to pay back the evaded amount plus the same amount as a fine. Participants also learned that at the end of 
the experiment their earned income in ECU would be converted into Euro (2800 ECU was equivalent to 1 Euro) and paid out. On 
average participants earned €5.48 for participating (min. €2.85; max. €7.14). 
Dependent Variables. The same dependent variables as in Experiment 1 were assessed: Tax payments, perceived antagonism- 
based climate (T1: α = 0.86, T2: α = 0.87), perceived confidence-based climate (T1: α = 0.92, T2: α = 0.90), implicit trust (T1: 
α = 0.88, T2: α = 0.90), and reason-based trust (T1: α = 0.78, T2: α = 0.83). 
Manipulation Check Variables. The same scales as in Experiment 1 were used: Perceived coercive power (T1: α = 0.81, T2: 
α = 0.90) and legitimate power (T1: α = 0.82, T2: α = 0.87). 
6.3. Statistical power 
The same sensitivity analyses as for Experiment 1 were conducted. Generally, sensitivity analyses for an ANOVA: repeated 
measures, within-between interaction (F-tests, p = .05, power = 0.80, six groups, two measures) indicate that with an N = 263 we 
can detect effects of f = 0.11 (d = 0.22). Concerning RQ1 and RQ2, sensitivity analyses for t-tests for dependent means (two-sided, 
p = .05, power = 0.80) showed that we can detect effects between d = 0.24 and d = 0.25 (min N = 123; max N = 140). The same 
sensitivity analyses (t-tests for dependent means, two-sided, p = .05, power = 0.80) indicated that for RQ3 (N = 35 and N = 28) 
effects between d = 0.49 and d = 0.55 can be detected and for RQ4 (N = 24) effects of d = 0.60 can be detected. For RQ5 and RQ6, 
effects between d = 0.24 and d = 0.25 (min N = 123; max N = 140) are detectable with the current design (t-tests for dependent 
means, two-sided, p = .05, power = 0.80). Cohen (1988) suggests that d = 0.20 are small effects, d = 0.50 are medium effects and 
d = 0.80 are large effects. Thus, with the current design we can detect at least medium effects. 
6.4. Manipulation checks 
Perceived Tax Climate (Time 1): Results showed that participants in the antagonism-based condition perceived the climate as 
more antagonism-based (M = 4.58; SD = 1.34) than those in the confidence-based condition (M = 2.53, SD = 1.44), t 
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(261) = 11.96, p  <  .001, d = 1.41. In a similar vein, participants in the confidence-based condition perceived the interaction 
climate as more confidence-based (M = 5.25, SD = 1.49) than those in the antagonism-based condition (M = 2.66, SD = 1.37), t 
(261) = 14.63, p  <  .001, d = 1.89. These findings suggest that our manipulation of interaction climate was successful. 
Perceived Coercive and Legitimate Power (Time 2): Results showed, as intended, that: (1) participants in the high coercive power 
condition (M = 5.77, SD = 1.31) perceived more coercive power than those in the low coercive power condition (M = 3.78, 
SD = 1.76; t[261] = 10.32, p  <  .001, d = 1.28) and (2) participants in the high legitimate power condition (M = 5.50, SD = 1.22) 
perceived more legitimate power than those in the low power condition (M = 3.77, SD = 1.40; t[261] = 10.68, p  <  .001, 
d = 1.32). 
6.5. Results 
Detailed analyses of direct and indirect effects are presented in Supplementary material (2.1). As in Experiment 1, we examined 
our research questions with repeated measurement ANOVAs and planned comparisons (paired t-tests)2. Fig. 4 provides an overview 
of the results. Descriptive results on all main and interaction effects are presented in the Supplementary material. 
Perceived Antagonism-based Climate. Supporting assumptions of RQ1, the Coercive power × Time interaction (F[1, 
255] = 94.66, p  <  .001, η2 = 0.21) showed that low coercive power decreased (T1: M = 3.58, SD = 1.75; T2: M = 2.95, 
SD = 1.41; t[139] = 3.66, p  <  .001, d = 0.40) and high coercive power increased the perceived antagonism-based climate (T1: 
M = 3.59, SD = 1.70; T2: M = 4.56, SD = 1.76; t[139] = -5.01, p  <  .001; d = 0.56). 
Supporting assumptions of RQ2, the Legitimate power × Time interaction (F[1, 255] = 64.40, p  <  .001, η2 = 0.15) showed that 
low legitimate power increased (T1: M = 3.49, SD = 1.69; T2: M = 4.34, SD = 1.69, t[137] = 4.98, p  <  .001; d = 0.50) and high 
legitimate power decreased the perceived antagonism-based climate (T1: M = 3.69, SD = 1.76, T2: M = 2.99, SD = 1.59; t 
[124] = 3.53, p  <  .001; d = 0.42). 
In agreement with the reasoning underlying RQ3, planned comparisons showed that the combination of high coercive and high 
legitimate power decreased the perceived antagonism-based climate in an initial antagonism-based climate (T1: M = 4.48, 
SD = 1.23; T2: M = 3.56, SD = 1.47; t[34] = 3.88, p  <  .001, d = 0.75) and increased the perceived antagonism-based climate in 
an initial confidence-based climate (T1: M = 2.26, SD = 1.10; T2: M = 4.02, SD = 1.74; t[27] = 5.76, p  <  .001, d = 1.17). 
Perceived Confidence-based Climate. Supporting assumptions of RQ1, the Coercive power × Time interaction (F[1, 
255] = 13.93, p  <  .001, η2 = 0.05) revealed that low coercive power had no impact on the perceived confidence-based climate (T1: 
M = 3.95, SD = 1.97; T2: M = 3.81, SD = 1.79; t[139] = 0.61, p = .55), whereas high coercive power decreased the perceived 
confidence-based climate (T1: M = 3.87, SD = 1.88; T2: M = 3.08, SD = 1.73; t[122] = 3.77, p  <  .001, d = 0.44). 
In agreement with the reasoning underlying RQ2, the Legitimate power × Time interaction (F[1, 255] = 63.44, p  <  .001, 
η2 = 0.20) showed that low legitimate power decreased (T1: M = 4.04, SD = 1.82; T2: M = 2.61, SD = 1.42, t[137] = 8.38, 
p  <  .001, d = 0.88) and high legitimate power increased the perceived confidence-based climate (T1: M = 3.77, SD = 2.03, T2: 
M = 4.42, SD = 1.69; t[124] = 2.91, p = .004, d = 0.35). 
Supporting assumptions of RQ3, the combination of high coercive with high legitimate power increased the perceived confidence- 
based climate in an initial antagonism-based climate (T1: M = 2.46, SD = 1.16; T2: M = 4.14, SD = 1.82; t[35] = 5.57, p  <  .001, 
d = 1.08) and decreased it in an initial confidence-based climate (T1: M = 5.73, SD = 0.99; T2: M = 3.63, SD = 1.41; t[27] = 7.23, 
p  <  .001, d = 1.71). In addition, supporting assumptions of RQ4, in an initial confidence-based climate, low coercive power 
combined with high legitimate power did not influence the perceived confidence-based climate (T1: M = 5.24, SD = 1.73; T2: 
M = 5.18, SD = 1.73; t[24] = 0.15, p = .884). 
Perceived Implicit Trust. In agreement with the reasoning underlying RQ1, the Coercive power × Time interaction (F[1, 
255] = 5.47, p = .020, η2 = 0.02) revealed that low coercive power had no impact (T1: M = 3.74, SD = 1.84; T2: M = 3.81, 
SD = 1.72; t[139] = 0.59, p = .56) and high coercive power decreased implicit trust (T1: M = 3.83, SD = 1.66; T2: M = 3.56, 
SD = 1.68; t[122] = 2.08, p = .04, d = 0.16). 
Supporting assumptions of RQ3, planned comparisons showed that the combination of high coercive with high legitimate power 
led to an increase in implicit trust in an initial antagonism-based climate (T1: M = 3.30, SD = 1.72; T2: M = 3.70, SD = 1.74; t 
[34] = -2.21, p = .034, d = 0.23), whereas the same power combination had no impact in an initial confidence-based climate 
(p = .336). Supporting assumptions of RQ4, results also showed that, the combination low coercive power with high legitimate 
power did not strongly decrease implicit trust in an initial confidence-based climate (T1: M = 4.37, SD = 1.46, T2: M = 4.33, 
SD = 1.75, t[24] = 0.34, p = .74). 
Perceived Reason-based Trust. Supporting assumptions of RQ2, the Legitimate power × Time interaction (F[1, 255] = 56.78, 
p  <  .001, η2 = 0.26) revealed that low legitimate power decreased reason-based trust (T1: M = 3.84, SD = 1.11; T2: M = 3.06, 
SD = 1.10; t[139] = 7.95, p  <  .001, d = 0.71) and high legitimate power increased reason-based trust (T1: M = 3.76, SD = 1.21; 
T2: M = 4.40, SD = 1.21; t[139] = 5.95, p  <  .001, d = 0.53). 
In agreement with the reasoning underlying RQ3, results of planned comparisons showed that the combination of high coercive 
with high legitimate power led to an increase in reason-based trust in an initial antagonism-based climate (T1: M = 3.31, SD = 1.34; 
T2: M = 4.31, SD = 1.34; t[34] = 4.99, p  <  .001, d = 0.75), whereas the same power combination had no impact in an initial 
2 All analyses were also conducted as ANCOVAs in which sex and age were used as covariates. All significant effects remained significant and all 
non-significant effects remained non-significant. 
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confidence-based climate (T1: M = 4.32, SD = 0.87; T2: M = 4.33, SD = 0.98; t[27] = 0.07, p = .94). Supporting assumptions of 
RQ4, results also showed that the combination low coercive power with high legitimate power did not strongly influence reason- 
based trust in the confidence-based climate (T1: M = 4.28, SD = 1.21, M = 4.53, SD = 1.46; t[23] = 1.20, p = .242). 
Tax Payments. Results showed a main effect for Climate (F[1, 255] = 9.98, p = .002, η2 = 0.04) indicating that a confidence- 
based climate led to more tax payments than an antagonism-based climate (T1: confidence-based climate: M = 0.74, SD = 0.33 vs. 
antagonism-based climate: M = 0.59, SD = 0.33; T2: confidence-based climate: M = 0.74, SD = 0.34 vs. antagonism-based climate: 
M = 0.63, SD = 0.36). No other main effects were significant (all ps  >  .07). 
Supporting assumptions of RQ5, the Coercive power × Time interaction (F[1, 255] = 6.03, p = .015, η2 = 0.02) showed that 
independent of the initial climate high coercive power increased tax payments (T1: M = 0.68, SD = 0.33; T2: M = 0.74, SD = 0.33, t 
[122] = 3.45, p = .001, d = 0.18), whereas low coercive power had no effect on tax payments (p = .59). 
Supporting assumptions of RQ6, the Legitimate power × Time interaction (F[1, 255] = 8.68, p = .004, η2 = 0.03) showed that 
high legitimate power increased tax payments (T1: M = 0.64, SD = 0.35; T2: M = 0.71, SD = 0.34; t[124] = -3.40, p = .001, 
Fig. 4. Overview of results of Experiment 2. Note: The figure shows how, depending on the initial antagonism-based climate (red T1) or confidence- 
based climate (green T1), the combinations of coercive and legitimate power at T2 led to an increase or decrease of (a) the perceived antagonism- 
based climate, (b) the perceived confidence-based climate, (c) implicit trust, or (d) reason-based trust (red for the initial antagonism-based climate 
and green for the initial confidence-based climate). Means are presented with 95% confidence intervals. T1 = Time 1 (in the figure, in contrast to 
the text, all four T1 assessments are presented in combination). Time 2 assessments are given for CP + LP+ = coercive power high, legitimate 
power, CP + LP- = coercive power high, legitimate power low, CP-LP+ = coercive power low, legitimate power high, CP-LP- = coercive power 
low, legitimate power low. 
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d = 0.21), whereas low legitimate power had no effect (T1: M = 0.68, SD = 0.34; T2: M = 0.66, SD = 0.36, t[137] = 1.23, 
p = .22). No other interaction effects were significant (all ps  >  .16). 
6.6. Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1′s main findings and offered additional support for the assumptions of our research 
questions on the effects of coercive power and legitimate power on building, changing, and maintaining climates. In agreement with 
the rational underlying RQ1, compared to low coercive power, high coercive power reduced implicit trust and increased a perceived 
antagonism-based climate and decreased a perceived confidence-based climate. Supporting assumptions of RQ2, high versus low 
legitimate power increased reason-based trust and fostered a perceived confidence-based climate and reduced a perceived antag-
onism-based climate. In agreement with the assumptions of RQ3, compared to in an initial antagonism-based climate, in a con-
fidence-based climate the combination of high coercive power and high legitimate power decreased implicit trust, reason-based trust, 
and the perceived confidence-based climate, whereas it increased the perceived antagonism-based climate. Supporting assumptions 
of RQ4, low coercive power combined with high legitimate power maintained reason-based, implicit trust, and a confidence-based 
climate. Finally, supporting assumptions of RQ5 and 6, compared to low coercive or legitimate power, high coercive power and high 
legitimate power increased tax payments. 
7. General discussion and conclusions 
The aim of the present research was to expand the knowledge on building and maintaining confidence-based climates with 
regulating public administrations, in particular tax authorities. The present research is based on the extended Slippery Slope 
Framework which, similar to other theoretical accounts (Adler, 2001; Alm & Torgler, 2011; Haslam & Fiske, 1999), suggests that 
citizens and public administrations cooperate in different interaction climates ranging from antagonism-based to confidence-based 
climates. The framework posits that based on these climates, the policy measures needed to build or maintain trust are markedly 
different (Gangl et al., 2015). In an antagonistic-based climate, authorities can build trust by regulating with legitimate sanctioning 
systems. In a confidence-based climate, however, coercive control and sanctions, even if they are applied in a legitimate way, erode 
trust and confidence. Thus, in a prevailing confidence-based climate likely only perceived low coercion combined with high legit-
imate power can maintain confidence and trust. 
Previous research indicated that existing individual perceptions and attitudes are cues that frame the meaning of policy measures 
(James & Van Ryzin, 2016; Olsen, 2017). However, to the best of our knowledge, no previous research examined experimentally how 
different initial interaction climates influence the building and maintaining of trust in public authorities. The literature typically 
reports that public institutions can increase citizens’ trust with legitimate sanctioning systems (e.g., Mooijman et al., 2017) without 
taking situational differences or temporal developments into account. The current two experiments confirm the assumptions of the 
extended Slippery Slope Framework and showed that only if the individually perceived interaction climate is antagonism-based, 
legitimate sanctioning systems increase trust and, in turn, foster a confidence-based climate. If the individually perceived climate was 
already confidence-based, legitimate sanctioning systems can be seen as a betrayal of trust (Joskowicz-Jabloner & Leiser, 2013) and 
undermine the confidence-based climate. Moreover, our results suggest that high legitimate power combined with low coercive 
power maintained an initial confidence-based climate. 
In addition to these novel findings, the present research corroborates prior research about the independent effects of coercive and 
legitimate power (Gangl et al., 2017; Hartl et al., 2015; Hofmann et al., 2014, 2017). Coercive power’s negative effects on (implicit) 
trust and cooperation, however, are rather small and not robust (Costa & Bijlsma-Frankema, 2007; Hofmann et al., 2017). This result 
indicates that there exists no simple negative relationship between coercive power and trust. Legitimate power, on the other hand, 
seems to have a strong positive effect on reason-based trust, the perception of a low antagonism-based and high confidence-based 
climate, and on cooperation, independent of the initial interaction climate (Hartl et al., 2015; Hofmann et al., 2014, 2017). 
Thereby, our results confirm that initial interaction climates can likely be changed and maintained by tax administrations’ 
coercive and legitimate power, as proposed by the extended Slippery Slope Framework (Gangl et al., 2015). Our exploratory 
analyses also suggested that initial confidence-based climates lead to higher tax cooperation than antagonism-based climates. In 
addition, the initial climates can have a prolonged impact on cooperation. An initial confidence-based climate led to more 
cooperation (i.e., tax payments) than an initial antagonism-based climate even after power was introduced (at T2). Results also 
showed that legitimate power had a robust impact on reason-based trust and tax payments, whereas coercive power’s impact was 
rather small and instable (Hofmann et al., 2017). This suggests that, compared to coercive power, legitimate power leads to more 
elaborate processing and highlights the moral implications of behaviour (Gangl et al., 2017). Results in line with previous 
research (Hartl et al., 2015; Hofmann et al., 2014, 2017) showed that, despite the differentiated impact on trust, coercive and 
legitimate power did not differ in their overall level of obtained tax compliance. This confirms that there is cooperation without 
trust (Yang, 2008). However, the cooperation obtained by trust and legitimate power is more efficient as costly monitoring can 
be reduced. 
An important strength of the present research is that we replicated our main finding in two experiments with different samples 
and different settings. Participants in our online experiment were a bit older and predominantly male, whereas those in our la-
boratory experiment were younger and predominantly female. In the first experiment, responses had no consequences, whereas in the 
second experiment, students were paid depending on their decisions. Thus, the two experiments balanced each other’s strengths and 
weaknesses. The converging evidence from two different experiments indicates that our findings are a robust phenomenon 
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(Hüffmeier, Mazei, & Schultze, 2016). Previous studies on the external validity of laboratory tax compliance experiments found that 
behavioural patterns of participants (also students) in the laboratory conform to those of taxpayers making similar decisions in 
naturally occurring settings (Alm, Bloomquist, & McKee, 2015). Nonetheless, tax experiments have like online or laboratory ex-
periments in general, a lower external validity than for example representative survey studies which, however, do not allow causal 
conclusions (Muehlbacher & Kirchler, 2016). Thus, to increase external validity of the present results, ideally, a large-scale field 
experiment using administrative data in which coercive and legitimate power are implemented in different countries varying in their 
antagonistic- and confidence-based tax climate should be conducted (Mascagni, 2018). Finally, we also argue that perceptions of tax 
climates are probably more important than “actual” tax policy or what is written in the law, as behaviour is built on perceptions. For 
instance, previous research showed that also media reports can elicit perceptions of powerful authorities and in turn influence the 
intention to be tax honest (Kasper, Kogler, & Kirchler, 2015). Thus, our results are not only theoretically but also practically relevant. 
The current experiments were designed to test the assumptions of the eSSF (Gangl et al., 2015). However, an important related 
question for future research would be whether there are threshold effects for coercive power. For instance, future experiments, ideally 
conducted in countries differing concerning their tax climates, could vary the degree of coercive power by using different audit 
frequencies while keeping a high degree of legitimate power constant, to examine the effect on the perceived confidence-based 
climate. Such investigations would inform authorities how much coercion is needed or too much in a specific situation. The current 
research examined how temporal changes influence trust and confidence development. However, also comparisons of the quality of 
relationship between different administrations might influence the interpretation of administrative measures and, thus, confidence 
development and change (Olsen, 2017). In addition, the relationship between trust in the administration and trust in fellow citizens 
and related perceived social norms needs further investigation. Empirical investigations are needed to examine how coercive and 
legitimate power impact the perceived social norm of cooperation and whether this also leads to trust in other citizens. Future 
research could also examine whether specific political orientations, religiosity or general trust are related to the perception of a 
specific interaction climate (Lozza, Kastlunger, Tagliabue, & Kirchler, 2013) and consequently to different reactions to coercive and 
legitimate policies. Moderator analyses also are relevant to further understand the relationship between coercive power and (implicit) 
trust. 
Practically, the present research suggests that tax administrations are well-advised to consider the specific perceived interaction 
climate of their taxpayers. Regulating institutions have to develop diagnostic capabilities to be able to plan and process targeted 
policies to specific groups (Braithwaite, 2003). The perceived interaction climate could be determined by survey studies to select the 
most effective strategy to foster trust and a confidence-based climate for a specific group of citizens. This targeted approach also 
would save resources as trusting citizens who likely have a high level of cooperation require less monitoring by expensive auditing 
schemes (Braithwaite, 2003). 
To conclude, the present results show that public administrations likely can change the interaction climate with their citizens by 
the means of coercive and legitimate power. They need to consider, however, the initial interaction climate, thus, the perceived 
interaction quality, before choosing the right combination of harsh and soft measures. 
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